This paper sets up a two-country model of oligopoly to analyse the relationship between trade costs and trade policy cooperation. Acting non-cooperatively, the two countries are caught in a prisoner's dilemma in which import tariffs are used to improve one country's terms of trade and to shift profits towards its domestic market at the expense of the other. The incentive to do this is higher when trade costs are lower. Cooperative trade policy, on the other hand, is concerned with minimising losses in transit, such that internationally efficient tariffs are lower when trade costs fall. Hence, there is a conflict of interest between unilateral and cooperative trade policy in response to reductions in trade costs. I then analyse trade policy cooperation which must be sustained by a reputational mechanism. I first demonstrate that, provided the two countries care sufficiently about the future, lower import tariffs are more self-enforceable when trade costs are lower. I also find that global free trade can be supported for a larger range of discount factors in response to falling trade costs, provided firms interact strategically.
Non-Technical Summary
In this paper, I construct a model of international oligopoly where two countries are unilaterally driven into a terms-of-trade and a profit-shifting prisoner's dilemma in the setting of trade policy. In addition to political import tariffs, world trade is subject to natural trade costs (or transport costs) which are outside the government's control.
I first identify key relationships between natural trade costs and trade policy. Unilaterally, the incentive to distort a country's terms of trade in its favour, and the incentive to shift profits towards its domestic market increases when trade costs decline. This is because when natural trade costs are lower, the degree of natural distortion of consumer prices, and the degree of natural profit-shifting towards the domestic market are lower, making import tariffs more effective at doing the job. Cooperative trade policy, however, has a different objective. Acting cooperatively the two countries set import tariffs to minimise global losses in transit. Hence, when trade costs are lower, a smaller amount of the traded quantities are lost in transit, facilitating lower cooperative tariffs. This implies that when trade costs decline, a conflict of interest between unilaterally optimal trade policy and cooperative trade policy intensifies.
I go on to examine the sustainability of cooperative trade policy when any trade policy must be sustained through a reputational mechanism. In an infinitely repeated game, I find that lower import tariffs can be lowered in response to falling trade costs provided the governments' long-run objectives of minimising losses in transit are sufficiently important relative to each government's short-run temptation to distort the terms of trade in its favour, and shifting profits towards the domestic market. In an impatient world, on the other hand, cooperative tariffs must be raised in response to lower trade costs, in order to keep each country's incentive to stay in the agreement.
Introduction
The history of trade liberalisation in the post-war era is intimately related with the expansion of the GATT/WTO, and to the signing of a countless number of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Since World War II, average ad valorem import tari¤s have been reduced from over 40 percent to less than 4 percent. There are clearly strong forces pushing countries to sign trade agreements, and it is important for economists and political scientists alike to understand the nature and causes of the desire to engage in cooperative trade policy. Why do countries sign trade agreements, and what determines the extent of trade liberalisation?
Did it occur because governments became aware of the harmfulness of non-cooperative trade policies, or was it caused by external events which made cooperation more favourable?
Along side the substantial reduction in politically-induced tari¤ protection, the post war era has witnessed a gradual decline in the overall level of trade costs. Figure 1 I construct a modi…ed version of Yi's (1996) extension of the Brander (1981) model of oligopoly with two countries called Home and Foreign, and with one …rm in each. Each …rm produces one good, and these goods are substitutable according to a substitution index which varies between zero and one. If the index is zero each …rm is a monopolist and there is no strategic interaction amongst them. If the index is one, the two …rms produce homogeneous goods. Unilaterally, each country maximises individual welfare with respect to an import tari¤, and the model o¤ers two motives to grant such import protection: (i) a terms-of-trade motive, and (ii) a pro…t-shifting motive. The …rst motive arises due to the in ‡uence of import tari¤s on the net-of-tari¤ price of an imported good. This motive is standard in the trade-policy literature, and it was …rst identi…ed by Johnson (1954) for perfectly competitive The key is that a country as a whole can use its monopoly power over its terms of trade to improve welfare. The second motive arises due to rent-shifting made possible by the oligopolistic distortion. By reducing market access for the foreign exporter, import tari¤s can shift pro…ts towards the domestic producer. This motive is absent under perfect competition where prices are equal to marginal costs. I make a clear distinction between trade costs that are politically induced which in the present model consist of import tari¤s, and those trade costs which are natural in the sense that governments are unable to in ‡uence them through policy. In the trade literature, it is most common to refer to such trade barriers as transport costs, but I stress natural trade costs because I want these to comprise all kinds of barriers to trade which are outside the in ‡uence of government. These could include: transport technology, storage, inventory and preparation technology, communications networks, language barriers and so on.
The incentives to impose import tari¤s through improved terms of trade and higher domestic pro…ts are not invariant to changes in natural trade costs. In fact, when natural trade costs are lower the unilateral gain from imposing import tari¤s is higher. This is because when Home's consumer prices and domestic pro…ts are distorted to a lesser extent by natural trade costs, a politically induced import tari¤ is more e¤ective at distorting terms 1 Microfoundations for such a terms-of-trade distortion is modelled in Grossman and Helpman (1995).
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of trade in Home's favour, and shifting pro…ts towards the Home producer in the domestic market.
Unilateral trade policy produces international externalities, however, since a country's trading partner will see a worsening of its terms of trade and pro…ts shifted away from their …rm. These international distortions are greater the lower the level of natural distortions through trade costs. The countries engaged in a tari¤ war will …nd themselves caught in a terms-of-trade and a pro…t-shifting prisoner's dilemma and they may be willing to cooperate in order to reach a more e¢ cient equilibrium.
I …rst consider an equilibrium in which Home and Foreign are able to sign a binding trade agreement which is perfectly enforceable. In this situation, Home and Foreign simply maximise joint welfare with respect to import tari¤s to reach the optimal level of joint welfare, thus neutralising the externalities of unilateral trade policy. However, since the presence of natural trade costs represents losses in transit, globally e¢ cient trade policy involves setting lower tari¤s when trade costs fall. More speci…cally, due to the oligopolistic distortion …rms produce suboptimal quantities and in the absence of trade costs, it is optimal to subsidise them. When trade costs are positive, however, the governments balance subsidising the oligopolistic …rms against minimising losses in transit. Hence, when acting to maximise global welfare, the two countries will set lower tari¤s in response to exogeneous decreases in natural trade costs. There is, therefore, a con ‡ict of interest between unilateral and global trade policy: unilaterally, it is optimal to raise tari¤s when trade costs fall, whereas bilaterally it is optimal to lower the tari¤s. The joint welfare gain from cooperation is thus larger when trade costs are lower. I then move on to discuss trade agreements in a framework where the two countries are unable to write binding contracts. While the literature on trade agreements o¤ers several approaches to modelling imperfect contract enforcement, one particular approach which is based on repeated games stands out. According to these models, trade policy cooperation is limited by countries' weighting the one-shot incentives to deviate from an agreed-upon tari¤ against the discounted bene…ts from future cooperation. This view of trade policy cooperation is a fair re ‡ection of reality since the world is currently not equipped with an international law enforcement agency capable of sanctioning nations that do not honour international agreements. The GATT/WTO has served as an international institution o¤ering a negotiation forum, which allows countries to reach a higher welfare through mutual tari¤ 3 concessions. Outside enforcement is ensured through a number of rules, permitting countries to punish cheating nations 2 .
In this paper, I model trade policy cooperation as a repeated prisoner's dilemma. The two countries can choose to sign any agreement specifying that tari¤s be lowered from their non-cooperative levels. Once such an agreement is signed, however, any of the two countries has a one-shot incentive to deviate from an agreed-upon tari¤ by distorting the terms of trade in their favour, and shifting pro…ts towards their respective domestic …rms when the other country cooperates. It is assumed that if a country does not honour an agreed-upon tari¤, the other country will punish it by reverting to the non-cooperative Nash tari¤s forever as of the following period. Self-enforceability thus implies that the present discounted value of honouring a trade agreement must be greater than or equal to the one-shot payo¤ from deviating and the present discounted value of in…nite Nash reversion.The requirement of self-enforceability may, therefore, constrain the trade agreement to a second-best one from a joint welfare-maximising perspective in order to keep each country's incentive to stay in the agreement.
I consider two types of agreements which are subject to a self-enforcement constraint.
The …rst type is based on what I de…ne as the optimal self-enforceable tari¤, and the second is a free trade agreement (FTA).
The …rst type is the tari¤ which obtains when the two countries maximise their joint welfare with respect to import tari¤s subject to the self-enforcement constraints. If the world is very patient the self-enforcement constraint is not binding, and the two countries are simply able to implement the internationally e¢ cient tari¤s. On the other hand, if short-run considerations are so important that the the self-enforcement constraint binds, the agreement must involve tari¤s that lie somewhere in between the e¢ cient tari¤s and the politically optimal Nash tari¤s in order to persuade each country to adhere to the agreement. I then go on to examine how exogeneous changes in natural trade costs a¤ect the optimal self-enforceable tari¤s. It turns out that if countries are very impatient such that short-run considerations are important, tari¤s need to be raised in response to falling trade costs. This is because when trade costs fall the one-shot payo¤ from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ increases, since there is a greater bene…t from distorting terms of trade in a country's favour, and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm . On other words, in order to keep an impatient country's incentive to stay in the agreement, tari¤s need to be raised in response to falling trade costs in order to reduce the short-run payo¤ from unilateral deviation. If the world is su¢ ciently patient, however, the long run payo¤ from cooperation is relatively more important, and for that reason the joint objective of minimising losses in transit becomes more important. While this may not imply that the internationally e¢ cient tari¤s are selfenforceable, countries care su¢ ciently about the future to sustain lower tari¤s in response to falling trade costs. Hence, the relationship between tari¤s and trade costs depends crucially on how patient the world is. I demonstrate that tari¤s fall in response to falling trade costs for the largest range of discount factors, allowing the two countries to increase their welfare.
The second type of agreement, a FTA, is useful for several reason. First, the post-war era has witnessed the emergence of a large number of FTAs, and it is therefore interesting to see how trade costs a¤ect the sustainability of such an agreement. Second, because a FTA involves removing import tari¤s as a trade policy instrument it may be that such an agreement is the most self-enforcing if there are …xed costs associated with reinstating customs and border controls. Although I do not model such …xed costs explicitly, they could easily be added to the model. I de…ne a critical discount factor above which a FTA is selfenforceable. This discount factor is given as the ratio of the one-shot gain from deviating from a FTA to the long-run loss from in…nite Nash reversion. I demonstrate that the oneshot gain from deviating is greater when trade costs fall. This is because, relative to free trade, the one-shot bene…t from distorting the terms of trade and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm is higher when the natural distortion due to trade costs is lower. The long run loss from in…nite Nash reversion is also higher when trade costs fall, since the punishment in terms of lost pro…t in the export market and worsened terms of trade is higher when trade costs are lower. Provided that …rms interact strategically, I demonstrate that although the one-shot bene…t from deviating from a FTA is higher when trade costs are lower, the greater international externalities that would result from deviation ensures that a FTA is more sustainable when trade costs fall. Put di¤erently, a FTA can be supported for a larger range of discount factors when trade costs are lower. This relationship is steeper when the degree of strategic interaction is higher. I also show that there is a discontinuity in the relationship between trade costs and trade policy cooperation. In fact, there is a trade cost threshold that must be crossed before a FTA can be supported at all. This is because, when trade costs are above this threshold there are too many losses in transit such that free trade 5 is far too deep a trade liberalisation from a joint welfare-maximising perspective. If …rms do not interact strategically, there is no relationship between the critical discount factor and trade costs. This is because, when each …rm is a monopolist in its own market, the change (with respect to trade costs) in the unilateral gain from deviation is exactly proportional to change in the long run loss. Hence, there is no such relationship.
I would argue that this model is able to account for several aspects of the post-war era trade liberalisation. First, provided the world has been su¢ ciently patient, this theory can explain the gradual (rather than immediate) fall in import tari¤s. Due to the gradual decline in natural trade frictions, the world has experienced fewer losses in transit, making lower tari¤s more self-enforceable. This has allowed successive rounds of trade liberalisation through the GATT/WTO. Second, the theory may be able to explain why the developed world has experienced much deeper reductions in politically induced trade protection, since transport costs are generally much higher between poorer countries. Finally, since the theory suggests that global free trade is more self-enforceable when trade costs are lower, it can help explain the emergence of the large number of FTAs since World War II. At the same time, the model can be relevant in times of economic recessions, since the degree to which governments value the future often depends on the state of the macroeconomy. In times of recession, governments may care more about short-run considerations, and for that reason international law enforcement agencies may need to be deepened to deal with falling natural trade costs and the consequent increased incentives to deviate.
The literature on trade policy reveals many channels through which trade costs a¤ect the welfare of import tari¤s. In models where there is free entry and exit a standard motive for imposing import tari¤s is the so-called home-market e¤ect. Two prominent examples are Venables (1985) and Venables (1987) . The …rst of these models considers an oligopoly 6 model with free entry and homogeneous products while the second uses Dixit-Stiglitz style monopolistic competition. In both models, a positive import tari¤ imposed by one country has the e¤ect of attracting entry of …rms in that country and exit in the other. This increases the amount of goods available not subjected to costly trade costs thus increasing welfare for the country that imposes the tari¤. Countries will consequently …nd themselves caught in a tari¤ war to attract …rms.
Using a model of multinational enterprises, Ludema (2002) constructs a similar model where …rms face a trade-o¤ between being close to foreign markets (to avoid trade costs) and to concentrate production at home (to exploit economies of scale). When trade costs are reduced the incentive to unilaterally impose import tari¤s decreases since a smaller proportion of the traded quantities is lost in transit and the desire to exploit economies of scale is increased. The desire to cooperate is therefore also greater. Notice that the model in the present paper …nds that the incentive to impose import tari¤s increases when trade costs fall which is the opposite to Ludema's (2002) …nding. It is therefore reassuring that the …nding that a FTA agreement is more self-enforceable when trade costs are lower is the same in this model as in Ludema's (2002) . But in my model the result has a di¤erent driver, namely that the externalities that unilateral trade policy impose internationally when trade costs are lower makes a FTA more self-enforceable.
Ludema's (2002) model produces the counterfactual implication that there is a positive relationship between FDI and import protection. It is well known, however, that countries with larger FDI ‡ows have lower levels protection. Hence, the present paper demonstrates that the relationship between the self-enforceability of FTAs and trade costs carries over to an environment with di¤erent motives for trade policy.
More recently, Zissimos (2010) models the formation of FTAs as a coordination problem.
He shows how distance can be used to solve such coordination problems between countries.
His main …nding is that countries that are located closer to each other geographically (distance could here be interpreted as transport costs) impose greater externalities (in the form of terms-of-trade and pro…t-shifting distortions) upon each other, thus increasing the desire to coordinate their trade policy choices by forming a FTA. As in the present model, however, Zissimos (2010) does not invoke a requirement that trade agreements must be self-enforceable. Other papers which consider similar issues as the present paper in models of perfect competition include Bond and Syropoulos (1996) , Bond (2001) , and Bond,
Syropoulos and Winters (2001).
On the empirical side, very few papers have analysed the relationship between trade costs and cooperative trade policy, but casual observation should convince us that there is indeed a relationship. In fact, of the many variables which might explain the emergence of trade agreements proximity stands out. In the …rst systematic attempt to model the predictors of FTA membership, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) …nd that proximity is a good predictor of membership of FTAs. They …nd this result using a probit model for a sample of 54 countries (or 1431 country pairs).
Since I have restricted this model to a two-country framework, I am not contributing to the debate on regionalism as the absence of a third country omits the possibility of trade diversion. This could potentially a¤ect both the long-run bene…ts from cooperation and short-run incentives to deviate for the case of preferential trade agreements. If it is assumed that trade agreements are signed between natural trading partners, however, this trade diversion e¤ect may not pose a large problem. In any case, this paper may be more applicable to the case of multilateral trade agreements as negotiated under the GATT/WTO.
In the concluding section of this paper I discuss how my results might extend to frameworks with more than two countries.
The present paper also contributes to the literature on gradual trade liberalisation. In Furusawa and Lai (1999) , the requirement that trade agreements be self-enforceable induces gradual trade liberalisation. They construct a two-country two-sector trade model in which there is an adjustment cost to be incurred for a worker to move from one sector to the other.
If the two countries choose to embark on a path of trade liberalisation they will liberalise as much as possible while keeping each country's incentive to stay in the agreement. In every period, deeper trade liberalisation is made possible and the importable sector shrinks. In a similar model, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show that trade liberalisation can be gradual due to imperfect mobility of capital. This allows faster trade liberalisation when capital is more mobile. That paper, however, does not require trade agreements to be selfenforceable. In the present paper, gradualism emerges from the e¤ects of trade costs: a gradual exogenous deline in trade costs makes lower tari¤s more self-enforceable.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present the model of oligopoly which will be used throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses the unilateral trade policy equilibrium, before Section 4 moves on to discuss how cooperative trade policy can be used to solve this ine¢ ciency. In Section 5, I discuss how the requirement of self-enforceability can change the outcomes of cooperative trade policy, and Section 6 concludes while discussing some useful extensions.
The model
In this section I present a version of Yi's (1996) extension of the Brander (1981) model of trade with oligopoly. I consider a world with two countries called Home and Foreign and an in…nite number of discrete time periods. Each country has one …rm each producing one good. I assume there is no entry/exit such that …rms make abnormal pro…ts in equilibrium.
Preferences are identical across countries and can be represented by the following quasilinearquadratic utility function in each period:
where q ij is country i's consumption of country j's products,
The numeraire is freely traded across countries to settle the balance of trade, and I assume that each country's endowment of this good is su¢ cient to guarantee a positive consumption in equilibrium. The parameter 2 [0; 1] represents a substitution index: when = 0 goods are independent and each …rm is a monopolist in its own market. As increases goods become closer substitutes. Assuming < 1 consumers have a taste for variety. Notice that can be thought of as a measure of the degree of strategic interaction between …rms, such that a higher implies a more direct competition among …rms.
The two countries may not be symmetric in every aspect but for convenience I shall present all economic expressions for Home as the analogous expressions for Foreign are not hard to express once the reader has been presented with the expressions for Home. By maximising utility in (1) it is possible to derive Home's demand for the Home …rm's good and the Foreign …rm's good, respectively, as:
The analogous demand functions for Foreign's demand for the Home good and the Foreign good can be found by exchanging h and f in (2) . Trade is subject to natural trade costs of the iceberg form. In order for one unit of exports to arrive in Home, 1 + h units must be produced. Similarly, in order for one unit of exports to arrive in Foreign, 1 + f units must be produced. I assume there are no internal natural trade costs. In addition to natural trade costs the governments of each country are able to impose political trade costs in the form of a speci…c import tari¤. I assume that tari¤s are country-speci…c such that Home sets a tari¤ equal to h on imports from Foreign's …rm, and Foreign sets a tari¤ equal to f . I also assume there are no internal political trade barriers.
Both …rms produce at the same marginal cost of c in their respective domestic markets, 
Using (2) these conditions can be rewritten as:
Summing the …rst-order conditions in (4) gives the following per-period quantities in Cournot equilibrium:
where ( ) is de…ned as (k; ) 2 + k , and I have normalised such that a c = 1.
By summing the quantities produced by each …rm I get an expression for the total quantity demanded in Home:
By solving the pro…t maximising problems for the Home and Foreign …rms, respectively, in the Foreign market I obtain the analogous expressions for Cournot quantities in the Foreign
The equilibrium quantities have the following properties:
If Home raises its tari¤ on imports of goods from Foreign, the consumption of foreign imports as well as the total consumption fall, but the consumption of Home's domestic good increases.
Exogenous increases in natural trade costs, h , have the same e¤ect on quantities. In fact, what matters for the equilibrium quantities are total trade costs whether political or natural.
A similar argument applies to quantities in Foreign.
Using the …rst-order condition in (3) I obtain the equilibrium per-period pro…ts of the two …rms in the Home market:
Hence, I have,
If Home raises its tari¤ (or there is an exogenous rise in natural trade costs) on imports from Foreign, the Home …rm's pro…ts from domestic sales rise, but the export pro…ts of the Foreign …rm in Home fall. It is, analogously, possible to express the pro…ts of the Home …rm and of the Foreign …rm, respectively f f and f h , in the Foreign market, and apply the same arguments to pro…ts there.
There are two sources of gains from trade in the model: an increased variety of goods and decreased market power of the domestic industry. When the substitution index is lower, consumers value variety whereas the pro-competitive e¤ect is higher when is higher.
I de…ne total consumer welfare in Home, C h , to be the consumers surplus enjoyed from consuming every variety (provided < 1) and the tari¤ revenue which is redistributed back to individuals in a lump-sum fashion. I can express this total consumer welfare in each period as:
The total pro…ts of Home's …rm consist of the pro…ts it makes from serving its domestic market as well as its pro…ts from supplying the market in Foreign. I can express these per-period aggregate pro…ts as:
The per-period welfare of each country can be expressed by adding up consumer welfare in (7) and pro…ts in (8):
Exchanging h and f in equations (8)-(9) gives the corresponding per-period expressions for consumer surplus, tari¤ revenue and aggregate pro…ts for Foreign.
Unilateral trade policy
When acting non-cooperatively, it is assumed that the governments of each country set tari¤s so as to maximise their individual welfare. The governments move …rst by setting optimal tari¤s and the two …rms then set Cournot quantities subject to the tari¤s chosen by the governments in each market. As discussed in Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Mrazova (2011), it is possible to decompose the welfare e¤ects of import tari¤s into a terms-of-trade e¤ect (ToT), a volume-of-trade e¤ect (VoT), and a pro…t-shifting (PS) e¤ect. Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to h yields 3 ,
where p hf is the net-of-tari¤ price of Foreign's good sold in Home, or p hf = p hf h . The ToT e¤ect is the variation in the net-of-tari¤ price which Foreign's …rm receive for their exports to Home. In this model, the ToT e¤ect is positive such that an increase in Home's import tari¤ improves Home's terms of trade. The tari¤ reduces Home's volume of trade (V oT 0) due to a higher consumer price of imports, but it shifts pro…ts from foreign exporters to domestic producers by reducing market access (P S 0). This last e¤ect is due to the oligopolistic distortion where the import tari¤ moves the domestic …rm towards the Stackelberg leader output level. This e¤ect would be absent under perfect competition where prices equal marginal costs. Moreover, if there were no strategic interaction between …rms ( = 0), then dq hh d h = 0, such that there would be no pro…t-shifting incentive for imposing import tari¤s. In this case, the only motive to unilaterally impose tari¤s is to switch the terms of trade in its favour. However, when oligopoly matters there are two motives: to improve the terms of trade and to shift pro…ts towards domestic …rms. Substituting the Cournot quantities (5) and the inverse demand function (2) in (10), I can solve for the optimal non-cooperative tari¤s for Home, and analogously for Foreign, as 4 :
where the superscript N on the optimal tari¤ in (11) which stands for Nash, and is there to illustrate the prisoner's dilemma nature of non-cooperative trade policy. Notice that Home's (Foreign's) optimal tari¤ is independent of the trade costs incurred by exporting to Foreign (Home). Notice further from Appendix A that the governments do not set Nash tari¤s strategically such that the Nash tari¤ in Home (Foreign) is independent of the Nash tari¤ in Foreign (Home). This feature of the model is due to the fact that the two countries'markets are segmented. Because of the assumed linear demand function it is possible that tari¤s become prohibitive. To rule this out I impose the condition,
on Home (Foreign) trade costs throughout the rest of the paper. In Appendix C, I prove the following proposition:
there exists a unique non-prohibitive Nash tari¤ for Home (Foreign).
It is useful to see how changes in Home trade costs change the incentive to impose import tari¤s. Taking the derivative with respect to h in (10) yields 5 :
This implies that as h falls, the gain from imposing tari¤s increases. This is because when natural trade costs are lower, the natural distortion of pro…ts and consumer prices is lower, making import tari¤s more e¤ective at switching terms of trade in Home's favour, and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm in the domestic market. Hence, the negative correlation between the Nash tari¤s and trade costs, that is
. Unilateral trade policy is ine¢ cient, however, as one country's welfare gain comes at the expense of the other. By taking the derivative of Home's welfare with respect to the Foreign 4 See Appendix B for the derivation. 5 See Appendix B for the derivation. import tari¤ it is similarly possible to decompose the welfare e¤ect into a terms-of-trade (ToT), a volume-of-trade (VoT) and a pro…t-shifting (PS) component 6 :
where p f h is the net-of-tari¤ price of Home's good sold in Foreign. Substituting Foreign's Nash tari¤ in (11) into (14) yields 7 :
Hence, by acting non-cooperatively, international trade policy produces a terms-of-trade and a pro…t-shifting externality. It is also clear from (15) that this externality becomes more severe when trade costs are lower:
It is similarly possible to see how the substitution index a¤ects international externalities by taking the derivative of (15) with respect to :
An increase in the degree of strategic interaction among …rms, thus, increases international externalities. A trade agreement may be used to overcome this prisoner's dilemma by inducing cooperation.
Trade liberalisation with commitment
In this section, I derive the most e¢ cient tari¤s which would obtain if the two countries were able to commit themselves to all future tari¤s as stipultated by a trade agreement. This implies that Home and Foreign are not allowed to deviate from an agreed-upon tari¤. This case would arise, for example, if there was a supra-national government, or some international law enforcement agency which was able to ensure that agreements are honoured. Given this environment, the governments of Home and Foreign set two cooperative tari¤s, C h and C f , to maximise the present discounted value of their joint welfare:
6 See Appendix A for the derivation. 7 See Appendix B for the derivation.
14 where < 1 is the discount factor assumed symmetric across countries. As with unilateral policy the governments move …rst by setting e¢ cient tari¤s and …rms then choose quanities subject to those tari¤s.Taking the derivative of (16) with respect to h yields the following …rst order condition 8 :
Exchanging h and f in (17) gives the analogous …rst order condition for the Foreign cooperative tari¤. Substituting the inverse demand functions (2) and the Cournot quantities (5) into (17), I can solve for the internationally e¢ cient tari¤ for Home, and analogously for Foreign, as 9 :
.
Thus, if Home and Foreign were able to commit to any tari¤ they would choose E h and E f , respectively, in every period forever. In the absence of any trade costs h = f = 0, the e¢ cient cooperative tari¤s are negative. This is because in the presence of oligopolistic markets, …rms produce suboptimal quantities and it is therefore e¢ cient to subsidise them.
As trade costs increase (both Home and Foreign, respectively, h and f ), however, an increasing amount of the traded quantities are lost in transit. Hence, from a joint welfaremaximising perspective it becomes optimal to subsidise the traded quantities less, and as trade costs reach a critical threshold it will be more e¢ cient to impose a positive tari¤ to reduce the quantity lost in transit. If trade costs are symmetric, this critical threshold can be solved from (18) as,
In Appendix D, I show that as trade costs symmetrically approach their upper bounds in (12) , the e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) converge to the Nash tari¤s in (11) , and in the limit they are equal:
Notice the con ‡ict of interest between non-cooperative and cooperative trade policy.
When acting unilaterally countries wish to set higher tari¤s when trade costs fall, but from a bilateral perspective tari¤s should be lowered when trade costs fall. In order to get a feel (12)). The reason for setting equal to this value is purely for illustrative purposes, and it could be set at any other value yielding similar results.
Trade liberalisation without commitment
In this paper, focus lies primarily on cooperative tari¤s which can be sustained through a reputational mechanism. This implies that Home and Foreign do not necessarily achieve the highest possible level of long-run welfare in any agreement as in the previous section. This is because in every period, as will be clear below, each country is weighting the short-run gain from deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ against the long-run gain from adhering to it.
Thus, because of the requirement of self-enforceability, one could say that from a long-run prespective, the two countries may be constraining themselves to a second-best agreement.
In this section, I consider two types of agreements which are subject to a self-enforcement constraint. First, I solve for the optimal bilateral tari¤ which can be sustained through a reputational mechanism. This optimum tari¤ depends crucially on the degree of patience of the two countries. Patient countries are able to agree upon tari¤s which are closer to the e¢ cient tari¤s of the previous section, whereas impatient countries cannot sustain signi…cant departures from the Nash tari¤s. Second, I will analyse the self-enforceability of global free trade. This particular case is useful since many countries have signed FTAs in the post-war era. Since a FTA involves removing import tari¤s as a trade policy instrument, it could be argued that such an agreement is the most self-enforceable if there is a …xed cost associated with reinstating customs and border controls. I am not modelling this …xed cost explicitly but it could easily be added to the analysis. In both cases, I will examine how trade costs a¤ect the incentives to engage in cooperative trade policy.
As with the case of unilateral trade policy, the setting of cooperative trade policy can be considered as a two-stage game: in the …rst stage governments jointly set tari¤s, and in the second the two …rms choose Cournot output levels in, respectively, the Home and Foreign market. The two countries play this two-stage game in every period an ini…nite number of times. A strategy is an in…nite sequence of functions mapping the history of play into current actions. Let the cooperative tari¤s be given as the pair C h ; C f , such that the present discounted value of adhering to the agreement is:
I assume that if a country does not honour the trade agreement in any given period, the other country will punish it by reverting to the politically optimal Nash tari¤ forever as of the following period. The deviating country will, however, enjoy a short run bene…t from deviation by distorting the terms-of-trade in its favour and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic industry. It is possible to …nd this one-shot deviation payo¤ from the point of view of Home by substituting Home's non-cooperative Nash tari¤ from (11) into the expression for welfare:
where the superscript D stands for deviation. Since the other country will punish the cheating nation by reverting to the Nash tari¤ forever as of the following period, the deviation payo¤ reduces to the following after one period:
where the superscript P stands for punishment. The present discounted value of the deviation welfare in Home can thus be expressed as:
In order for a trade agreement to be self-enforceable, the welfare from honouring the trade agreement must be greater than or equal to the welfare from deviation. The discounted value of the welfare from cooperation can be obtained from (21) and together with (22) I can express the following self-enforcement constraint for Home:
Optimal self-enforceable tari¤s: explaining gradualism in trade liberalisation
The e¢ cient tari¤s obtained in Section 4 may not be supported in an agreement which is subject to a self-enforcement constraint for all discount factors. It may be that higher tari¤s can be agreed-upon, however, which can be sustained by repeated interaction. In this subsection, I de…ne an optimal self-enforceable tari¤ and examine the relationship between this tari¤ and natural trade costs. For the purposes of this subsection I assume that trade costs are symmetric such that h = f = . Before proceeding, however, it will be useful to calculate the level of patience required to sustain the internationally e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) .
This can be done by solving (23) for a critical discount factor, e , above which an agreement stipulating that Home and Foreign adhere to the e¢ cient tari¤s, E h and E f , respectively, is self-enforceable:
Notice that the numerator of (24), W D h W C h , is the short-run bene…t to Home from deviating from the internationally e¢ cient tari¤ when Foreign cooperates. This is given as the short run bene…t from switching the terms of trade in Home's favour, and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm in the Home market relative to the e¢ cient tari¤s. The denominator of (24), W D h W P h , is the long-run loss in welfare when Foreign, which was caught by surprise in the previous period, retaliates by reverting to the Nash tari¤. The critical discount factor is thus given as the ratio of the short-run gain from deviation to the long-run loss. In Appendix E, I demonstrate that this critical discount factor is,
Hence, for any discount factor greater than e the internationally e¢ cient tari¤s can be sustained. Notice that this discount factor is independent of . When trade costs fall, the temptation to cheat on the agreement increases but so does the long-run bene…t of adhering to it, leaving the critical discount factor unchanged. Notice further that e is increasing in 10 . When is larger, the temptation to unilaterally deviate from an agreement by distorting terms of trade and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm is larger raising the level of patience required to sustain the e¢ cient tari¤s.
If the two countries discount the future at a level lower than e , however, it is then possible to …nd a tari¤ which improves welfare whilst keeping each country's incentive to stay in the agreement? Let the optimal self-enforceable tari¤s for Home and Foreign be given as the pair S h ; S f . To …x ideas, I rewrite the self-enforcement constraint (23) for Home in the following convenient way:
and symmetrically I can write the self-enforcement constraint for Foreign by exchanging h and f as:
Home and Foreign would jointly like to achieve the highest level of long-run welfare by maximising joint welfare (16) . The requirement of self-enforceability, however, constrains the two countries by (26) and (27). The optimal self-enforceable tari¤ solves the following:
s:t: (26) and (27).
If the discount factor e , the constraints in (26) and (27) are not binding, and Home and Foreign will set import tari¤s at their e¢ cient levels given in (18) . Otherwise they will set import tari¤s at their minimum self-enforceable levels. In Appendix E, I show that the minimum self-enforceable tari¤s which solve (28) when (26) 
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In order to get a feel for these tari¤s, imagine two extreme worlds. The …rst world is characterised by extreme myopia, such that Home and Foreign care only about welfare in the current period ( = 0). Setting = 0 in (29) it is clear that in this case, the selfenforceable tari¤s are equal to the Nash tari¤s. If the world cares only about current-period welfare, no departures from the Nash tari¤s are possible. In the second world the two countries are characterised by farsightedness with a discount factor in the range, 2] e ; 1[.
In this case, the two countries are patient enough to implement the e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) .
Thus, in an extremely myopic world, no agreement is possible since only the Nash tari¤s are sustainable, but in a very farsighted world, the e¢ cient tari¤s can be implemented. But how about discount factors that lie in between these cases? Assume now that the world discounts the future at the rate 2]0; e [. This is where the minimum cooperative tari¤s (29) become important. These tari¤s can be thought of as a weighted average of the Nash tari¤s and the e¢ cient tari¤s. A property of the minimum tari¤s which I prove in Appendix E is that, when trade costs increase towards the upper bound they converge towards the Nash tari¤s:
This is due to the property that there is no con ‡ict between unilateral and cooperative trade policy in the limit where import tari¤s are prohibitive. Formally, I can …nd out the relationship between trade costs and trade policy by taking the derivative of (29) wrt. . 
For convenience, I am going to de…ne medium to high discount factors as any discount factor greater than the threshold given in (31). Any discount factor lower than or equal this threshold is de…ned as a low discount factor. With a slight abuse of terminology, I am going to say that the world is patient if they have medium to high discount factors, and impatient if they have low discount factors. Hence, if the countries are patient, and if they implement the tari¤s, S h and S f , respectively, they will set lower tari¤s when trade costs fall. If, on the other hand, countries are impatient, they may still …nd cooperative tari¤s which can make them both better o¤. These cooperative tari¤s, however, will need to be raised in response to falling trade costs. The reason for these relationships are as follows. As can be seen from (26) the greater is the discount factor, the greater the valuation the two countries will place on their welfare in the long run. This implies that for a patient world, the cooperative tari¤ must be closer to the e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) , which are increasing in trade costs. In this patient world, therefore, the objective of Home and Foreign is mainly to use import tari¤s jointly to minimise the transit losses associated with trade costs. In an impatient world, on the other hand, the cooperative tari¤s must be closer to the Nash tari¤s, which are decreasing in trade costs. In this case, if tari¤s depart signi…cantly from their Nash levels, the temptation to distort terms of trade and to shift pro…ts towards the domestic …rms is too large. Hence, in a patient world, trade liberalisation is deeper when natural trade costs fall.
Provided WTO member countries have been su¢ ciently patient, this may help explaining gradualism in the trade liberalisation rounds under the GATT/WTO. Falling trade costs, as evidenced in Figure 1 , may have facilitated deeper self-sustainable trade liberalisation over time. Impatient countries may also achieve trade liberalisation according to this theory, but stronger international law enforcement agencies are required to sustain welfare-enhancing trade liberalisation in response to falling trade costs.
In Figure 3 I depict the optimal self-enforceable tari¤ in Home as a function of trade costs for various discount factors in the range, 2]0; e [. The two bold lines are the e¢ cient and Nash tari¤s, respectively, reproduced from Figure 2 . The two dashed lines represent optimal self-enforceable tari¤s for discount factors of 0.2 and 0.5, respectively. When the discount factor is 0.2, short-run considerations are more important. In fact, in order to keep each country's incentive to stay in the agreement, tari¤s need to be raised in response to falling trade costs. In other words, because the future is not important enough, tari¤s must be raised in order to make sure each country does not fall for the temptation to distort the terms of trade in their favour, or shift pro…ts towards their respective domestic industries.
On the other hand, when the world discounts the future at the rate 0.5, gradual trade liberalisation is made possible by falling natural trade costs.
The self-enforceability of a FTA
In this subsection I will consider the sustainability of global free trade. This case is useful for at least two reasons: (a) many countries have signed FTAs in the post-war era, and (b) a FTA involves giving up import tari¤s as a policy instrument as opposed to the e¢ cient tari¤s which involve using import tari¤s to reach the maximum level of joint welfare. If customs and border controls involve signi…cant …xed costs, it may be that a FTA is more self-enforceable than any other agreement by removing import tari¤s as a policy option.
Global free trade, however, does not solve the problem of suboptimal quanties which is present under oligopolistic competition. Recall from Section 4 that the e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) may be positive for su¢ ciently high trade costs since the two countries jointly try to minimise traded quantities lost in transit. Hence, it will be the case that from a joint welfaremaximising perspective, free trade is far too deep a trade liberalisation once trade costs reach that threshold (see Eq. (19) ). It is, therefore, questionable whether the two countries would choose to sign a FTA at all in this situation. I am going to argue that the two countries would consider signing a FTA so long as the e¢ cient tari¤s are non-positive.
The cooperative policy options available to Home and Foreign are, respectively, the tari¤s
0 and E f 0. It will be convenient to express the selfenforcement constraint (23) in terms of a critical discount factor, c , above which the FTA is self-enforceable:
As with (24) the numerator of (32), W D h W C h , is the short-run bene…t from deviating from the FTA when the other country cooperates. This is given as the short run bene…t from switching the terms of trade in Home's favour, and shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm in the Home market relative to free trade. This gain depends only on trade costs incurred by exporting to Home, h , and it is independent of f . The denominator of (32), W D h W P h , is the long-run loss in welfare when the other country, which was caught by surprise in the previous period, retaliates by reverting to the Nash tari¤. This loss depends on natural trade costs incurred by exporting to Foreign, f , but is independent of h . The critical discount factor is thus given as the ratio of the short-run gain from deviation to the long-run loss. The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix F.
It would be realistic to assume, however, that in the real world, there is not so much asymmetry in terms of trade costs, in particular between developed nations. In the following, therefore, an assumption of symmetry is imposed, that is, h = f = , and equiproportional changes in trade costs are examined. Notice that both the numerator and the denominator of (32) are decreasing in . Hence, when decreases the short run gain from deviating from free trade will increase as will the long run punishment. Hence, there are two forces in play: (a) when there is fall in , the short-run gain from deviating from free trade increases, making the free trade agreement less self-enforceable, and (b) when there is a fall in , the long-run loss from deviating will decrease making the free trade agreement more selfenforceable. Thus, I have to examine how the gain (numerator) and the loss (denominator) vary proportionally with trade costs.
To …nd the net e¤ect I write up an expression for the critical discount factor 11 :
Taking the derivative with respect to yields:
On the basis of (34), I can propose the following: A proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix F. Provided there is strategic interaction among …rms it will be the case that when trade costs decline, tari¤s are more e¤ective at distorting the terms of trade in Home's favour and at shifting pro…ts towards the domestic …rm. The long run consequences of unilateral deviation are more severe when trade costs are lower, however, making the long-run bene…t from trade cooperation higher.
If there is no strategic interaction between …rms ( = 0), neither political trade costs nor natural trade costs are able to shift pro…ts towards the domestic …rm (see (6) ), and it is possible to rewrite the critical discount factor (33) as:
When = 0, the e¤ect of on the gain to consumers from deviating is exactly proportional to the loss in export pro…ts. This is because when goods are independent of each other, the change in welfare from natural trade costs a¤ects only traded goods. Thus, the change in the gain to consumers from deviating is proportional to the change in the loss in ‡icted upon the Foreign …rm's export pro…ts, and by symmetry this loss is equal to the Home …rm's loss in the Foreign market. The critical discount factor is therefore independent of and equal to a constant, in this model 3 10 . When increases the degree of strategic interaction between …rms increases, and pro…tshifting becomes a more important motive in the setting of trade policy. Therefore, a trade 11 See Appendix F for the steps behind this. agreement becomes less self-enforceable for every value of . This can be seen by taking the derivative of (33) with respect to :
It can also be seen from (34) that the relationship between c and becomes steeper when is higher. Taking the derivative of (34) with respect to yields,
In order to get a feel for the relationship between c and I draw them as a function of each other in Figure 4 for di¤erent values of . From the diagram it is clear that for = 0 the relationship is a ‡at line whereas when increases the relationship between c and becomes steeper. When the degree of strategic interaction between …rms is higher, the pro…t-shifting motive for trade policy becomes greater, raising the critical discount factor for every value of . However, a higher will raise the critical discount factor less for lower trade costs. This is because the problem of pro…t-shifting is larger when trade costs are lower increasing the incentive to cooperate. This implies that, in this model, FTAs have a greater regional bias when the degree of strategic interaction among …rms is higher.
It is possible that trade costs reach a threshold, b , above which a FTA is not self-enforceable at all. This threshold can be obtained from (33):
Solving for yields:
b 1 24 28 + 3 2 .
When is above this threshold, global free trade is too deep a trade liberalisation. From a joint welfare-maximising perspective, too many units of production are lost in transit at such high trade costs, and it is therefore more optimal to impose a positive import tari¤ closer to the Nash tari¤s.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have analysed the nature of the relationship between trade costs and trade policy under oligopoly. I …rst showed the di¤erence of objectives of uniltareal and cooperative trade policy. First, unilateral trade policy maximises each country's domestic welfare with respect to an import tari¤. The import tari¤ distorts the terms of trade and shifts pro…ts towards each country's respective domestic …rms. This import tari¤ is more e¤ective at accomplishing these aims when the degree of natural distortion through trade costs is lower.
Hence, each country would like to set higher tari¤s when trade costs are lower. Second, when the two countries set import tari¤s cooperatively these externalities are neutralised, and the resulting internationally e¢ cient tari¤s are lower when trade costs fall since their objective is to minimise losses in transit. Hence, the objectives of cooperative and non-cooperative trade policy diverge when trade costs fall: acting unilaterally, the two countries would like to raise tari¤s in response to falling trade costs, whereas the reverse is the case cooperatively. I then added a requirement that trade agreements be sustained under a reputational mechanism. I assumed that if either of the two countries defected from an agreement in any given period, the other would punish it by reverting to the politically optimal Nash tari¤ forever as of the following period. I analysed two types of such agreements. First, I considered the optimal self-enforceable tari¤ and demonstrated that provided the two countries care enough about the future, lower import tari¤s can be supported when trade costs fall. If the world was too impatient, however, tari¤s needed to be raised in response to falling trade costs to keep each country's incentive to remain in the agreement. This is because impatient countries would …nd it harder to resist the increased short runs gains from deviation when trade costs fall. Second, I considered a FTA, and looked at how changes in trade costs a¤ected the sustainability of such an agreement. When trade costs fall, the one-shot bene…t from deviating from a FTA increased, but so did the long run bene…t from cooperation. This is because the international externalities which unilateral deviation imposes lowers the incentives to deviate.
The model could be extended in several interesting ways. First, I have ignored potential and interesting asymmetries between countries. Imagine, for example, that each country hosts more than one …rm, and that the number of …rms is larger in one country than to the other. In this case the country with fewer …rms will su¤er less when the other country retaliates by reducing market access. It may then be that the small country will be less likely to honour a FTA than the larger country. Second, the model could be extended to include several countries, who sign up for mutually bene…cial tari¤ reductions. In this case, consider one home country and n 1 other countries. I could allow trade costs between Home and each of the n 1 countries to di¤er. Imagine that all of the countries come together in a GATT/WTO framework to sign a FTA. Provided that trade costs between Home and each of the n 1 members are not so high that a FTA is not optimal from a joint welfare-maximising perspective, such a scenario would yield the some results as in the present two country framework. If one country is so remote (in terms of trade costs) that free trade is not optimal, however, higher tari¤s would need to be negotiated with this country in order to ensure sustainability. Third, consider a three country version of this paper, where two of the three countries decide to sign a trade agreement without the third one. Such an agreement would not necessarily be welfare improving if substantial trade is diverted away from the third country. This would have consequences for both the short-run incentives to deviate and the long run bene…ts from deviation. It would be interesting to see how the results of the present paper would extend to such a setting.
Setting this expression equal to zero and rearranging I obtain:
3 (0; ) (2; ) h (0; ) (2; ) h + (0; ) (2; ) = 0.
Solving for h yields the expression in (11) . By writing up demand functions, Cournot quantities, and the expression for total welfare in the Foreign market, I could carry out the exact same steps for Foreign and obtain the optimal tari¤ for that country as well. Taking the derivative of (39) wrt. h , I obtain the expression in (13) . q.e.d.
By writing up expressions for the inverse demand functions and Cournot quantities in the Foreign market, an expression for (38) can be found as:
dW h d f = (0; ) 2 ( f + f ) (0; ) (2; ) 4 (0; ) (2; )
Substituting the Foreign Nash tari¤ from (11) into (40) yields the expression in (15) . q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 1
I need to show that the imported quantity in Home is positive when Home implements the Nash tari¤ in (11) . In other words, it is su¢ cient to show that (from (5) The joint welfare of Home and Foreign is given as:
The expression for welfare in Home is obtained by substituting (7) and (8) into the expression for Home welfare (9) . The equivalent expression for Foreign welfare is easily obtained by writing up the equivalent welfare expression by exchanging h and f in (9) . Substituting the expressions for Home and Foreign welfare into (41) yields: Substituting the inverse demand functions (2) and the equivalent demand functions for Foreign into (43) and performing several algebraic steps reduces (43) to:
which is the expression in (17) . Substituting the inverse demand functions (2) and the Cournot quantities (5) and the equivalent functions for Foreign into (44) yields:
J ( h ; f ; h ; f ) d h = 2 (0; ) (0; ) + h (4 + 2 ) + f (4 + 2 ) h (8 6 2 ) ( (0; ) (2; )) 2 (45) = 2 (0; ) (0; ) + h (4 + 2 ) + f (4 + 2 ) ( (0; ) (2; )) 2 h (8 6 2 ) ( (0; ) (2; )) 2 .
Solving for h yields: .
I could carry out the same steps to …nd E f , in which case I would …nd, by symmetry, that it is the same as h .
For symmetric trade costs h = f = it is easy to show that, in the limit, the e¢ cient tari¤s and the Nash tari¤s are equal. Setting (46) equal to (11) I obtain:
(0; ) (0; ) + (4 + 2 ) (4 3 2 ) = 1 3 .
Solving for yields = 1 3 4 , which is the upper bound proposed in (19). q.e.d. Derivation of Eq. (25), Eq. (29) and Eq. (30)
In order to derive the level of patience required for an agreement based on the e¢ cient tari¤s in (18) to be sustained for Home (and symmetrically for Foreign), I need to evaluate Home's welfare in the three cases where: (i) both countries cooperate, (ii) both play Nash, and (iii) Home deviates by playing Nash while Foreign cooperates. I can …nd the expressions for Home welfare by substituting the inverse demand functions (2) and the Cournot quantities (5) into (9) , and then evaluate them at the various tari¤ levels.Thus, after substantial algebraic manipulations, I obtain: Setting h = f = and dividing (48) by (49) yields an expression for the critical discount factor for symmetric trade costs:
which is the expression in (33). Taking the derivative wrt. yields:
It is clear that when = 0 this derivative is negative, and when > 0 it is strictly positive. This is what Proposition 3 claims. q.e.d.
